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Abstract Notwithstanding the significant investigatory and prosecutorial benefits of forensic science,
the marriage of law and science has most often been represented as discordant: a marriage of “opposites”
(Wonder 1989) that’s “troubled” (Haack 2009). Yet most critics rely upon cliche´d representations or
“caricatures” (Roberts 2012) to demonstrate how science and law represent two cultures. When official
concerns over the potentially deleterious coupling within the criminal justice system have reached a fevered
pitch, the fallout has often been a chorus of disapproval addressed to forensic science, but also denigration
of legal professionals for being unable or unwilling to forge a symbiotic relationship with forensic scientists.
The National Research Council’s 2009 National Academy of Sciences Report on forensic science heralds
the latest call for greater collaboration between the law and science, particularly in higher education
institutions (HEIs). To investigate the potential for interdisciplinary cooperation, a workshop was held
in the UK, attended by academics and practitioners from scientific, policing, and legal backgrounds.
The workshop marked the commencement of a project to facilitate building vital connections in the
academy, enabling law and science academics to “lower their drawbridges.” This article outlines some of
the discussion to elucidate areas of consensus, and where further dialogue is required before progress is
possible, but aims to strike a note of optimism that the “cultural divide” should not be taken to be so wide
as to be beyond the legal and forensic science academy to bridge.
Keywords Legal education, forensic science education, law and science
Introduction
The institutions of law and science are often depicted as
opposing sides of a “disciplinary divide” (Roberts 2012),
evoking C.P. Snow’s “cultural divide” between science and
the humanities (Snow 1959). Most often, the “uneasy rela-
tionship” (Berger and Solan 2008, p. 847) between the “in-
evitable bedfellows” (Condlin 1999, p. 183) of science and
law is explained with reference to “a particular concep-
tion of science and scientific knowledge” (de Melo-Martin
2008, p. 9), and the law “is frequently invoked in a loose
and sometime careless fashion” (Roberts 2012, p. 5). Re-
liance upon caricatures reinforces lax stereotypes while
adumbrating two cultures that, in reality, are not as ho-
mogenous as portrayed, are interconnected, and share
Received 22 February 2011; accepted 1 June 2011.
Address correspondence to Carole McCartney, School of Law, Leeds
University, The Liberty Building, Leeds, LS2 9JT, United Kingdom.
E-mail: lawcim@leeds.ac.uk.
many characteristics: “Law is not unitary. Neither is sci-
ence,” says Mashaw (2003, p. 135). It is also possible that
customary science/law narratives exaggerate the extent
to which law and science “clash,” when some scientific
disciplines are central to developments in legislation, reg-
ulation, and policy ( Jasanoff 1990, 1995), and science and
law is often co-produced ( Jasanoff 2005). In criminal law,
however, most authors believe the cultural divide meme
retains its explanatory power. As Saks and Faigman write,
the “first, and most basic” reason for the failure of courts
to expose flaws in forensic science “is the cultural divide
that separates law and science” (2008, p. 161).
Regardless of this wider science and law debate (which
brevity dictates must be continued elsewhere), there re-
main apposite and acute concerns regarding the status
of science utilized by the law, in particular forensic sci-
ence and its interplaywith criminal law. Research into the
causes of wrongful convictions clearly demonstrates that
if legal professionals are unable to competently assess and
handle scientific evidence, the pursuit of justice can be
81
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82 Cassella and McCartney
seriously hampered, potentially leading to factual errors,
as well as themisrepresentation and/ormisinterpretation
of evidence. In England and Wales, many infamous mis-
carriages of justice
had at their heart scientific evidence that was either
not disclosed, flawed, ormisrepresented in court. The Irish
bombing trials usedmethods of testing for explosives that
were invalid, while cases such as that of Kevin Callan1
exemplify grave miscarriages caused by flawed scientific
evidence. The successful appeal of Sally Clark2 focused at-
tention again on the non-disclosure by the prosecution of
importantmedical evidence aswell as theuse of erroneous
statistical calculations (McCartney 2006, p. 5).
In the United States, Garrett and Neufeld studied trial
transcripts where forensic analysts gave testimony in
cases where innocent defendants were on trial,3 find-
ing numerous trials where “forensic analysts called by
the prosecution provided invalid testimony at trial—that
is, testimony with conclusions misstating empirical data
or wholly unsupported by empirical data” (2009, p. 2).
They found that defense counsel rarely cross-examined
analysts, instructed experts of their own, or challenged
invalid forensic testimony. Expert evidence can be then
(mis)communicated to fact finders and decision makers
alike, many of who will struggle with scientific evidence,
compounding problems and potentially hindering their
appreciation of the reliability, relevance, and weight of
scientific evidence. The “epistemic incompetence” of the
jury (Mnookin 2008) is then extending to counsel, leaving
them incapable of gauging the reliability of the scientific
evidence adduced; according to Latham (2008), “There is
still widespread scientific illiteracy at the bar” (p. 33).
Judges have also been similarly strongly criticized:
“There are serious problems with the ways in which law
receives and manages expert evidence . . . trial and appel-
late judges are not without their share of responsibility
for the unfortunate state of affairs,” states Edmond (2011,
p. 177). Saks and Faigman (2008, p. 166) state that judges
are “failing in their obligations if they persist in their sci-
entific ignorance.” Such scientific illiteracy on the part
of the legal profession, when coupled with the flaws in
forensic science,4 form a toxic combination.5
Furthermore, there is a risk that science can become
shrouded in mystery and given a veil of infallibility.
Authors have been unable to accurately demarcate the
newly labeled ‘CSI effect’ (Gabel 2010), whereby lay peo-
ple in courtrooms enter with entrenched cultural expec-
tations regarding scientific evidence, garnered from view-
ing of multifarious popular television crime series (Cole
and Dioso-Villa 2007). These are not such novel issues
(widespread suspension of critical faculties in the face
of ‘science’ existed even before the white coat became
symbolic attire for its emissaries), albeit their diagnosis
and treatment is rare. However, claims McCartney (2008)
“Problems with forensic science, and mistakes made by
experts, are rehearsed in the media on an increasingly
regular basis. Normally absent from such criticisms is any
examination of why it was that no lawyer was able to spot
a potential issue or had drawn attention to errors before
damage was done” (p. 992).
While it is accepted that ‘bad’ (or ‘junk’ in American
parlance) science is being accepted by juries, “there is
a latent problem that often falls in the shadow of bad
science: bad lawyering” (Gabel 2010, p. 236). Perhaps trial
lawyers can no longer escape critical scrutiny of their role,
as Gabel (2010, p. 236) highlights:
While the NAS Report primarily thrashed forensic sci-
ence and crime labs, it did contain the somewhat hushed
admonition that lawyers and judges often have insuffi-
cient training and background in scientific methodology
and they often fail to fully comprehend the approaches
employed by different forensic science disciplines and the
reliability of the forensic science evidence that is offered
at trial.
In order to prevent the criminal justice process frombe-
ing derailed by these potential difficulties with utilizing
scientific evidence, epistemic incompetence, credulity,
and bad lawyering, it is argued that the legal profes-
sional should seek to shoulder greater responsibilitywhen
adducing expert evidence (Saks 2001; Gershman 2003;
Raeder 2007; Moriarty 2007; see Caudill 2003 and 2011
for an alternate view). Saks (2001) calls for trial lawyers
to be subject to disciplinary action if they knowingly rely
upon and adduce invalid expert evidence, while Gianelli
and McMunigal (2007) argue that there should be an ethi-
cal responsibility to not adduce flawed expert evidence. In
many legal jurisdictions, there is already a burden placed
upon the judge to act as a gatekeeper, with criteria set out
upon which they must base admissibility decisions. If it
were agreed that counsel should assume an enhanced re-
sponsibility to do some preliminary ‘reliability’ test of ex-
pert evidence theywish to adduce, evenbefore a judge acts
as gatekeeper, it would first require trial lawyers to un-
derstand somebasic scientific principles and the scientific
method at a bare minimum (arguably, as should any edu-
cated adult). Yet the so-called ‘scientific illiteracy’ among
the general public reaches into the legal community with
lawyers “naturally intimidated and overwhelmed by sci-
entific evidence” (Findley 2008, p. 931), or as Latham ex-
plains, “Lawyers, though they may be popular science en-
thusiasts, typically have little exposure to scientific train-
ing, and do not know how to read scientific literature crit-
ically” (Latham 2008, p. 33).6 This is not surprising when
looking at the scientific education (or lack thereof) of law
students, most of which have not studied any scientific
discipline post-16 (McCartney 2008).
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It is the case that the majority of England and Wales
university law students drop science early in their in edu-
cation; 18 percent of Leeds first-year law students (intake
of 2008) have one (rarely more) science A-levels (see Mc-
Cartney 2008).7 In the United States in the academic year
2007–2008, 4.3% of law school applicants had a natural
science degree; 2.7% had engineering, 0.8% computer sci-
ence and 0.9% had health professional degrees.8 As Gabel
(2010, p. 257) explains: “The overwhelming majority of
‘feeder’ degrees for law school are arts andhumanities and
business administration. Additionally, due to advanced
placement courses, some students have not even taken a
mathematics or science class since high school.” The tra-
ditional law degree then dilates this educational lacuna
by failing to introduce law students to basic scientific con-
cepts, or provide grounding in the work of scientists. “Al-
though law school could be described as a glorified liberal
arts education, it generally does not include courses in re-
search methods and statistics. Even where such courses
are available, they are taken by a small percentage of stu-
dents,” explain Saks and Faigman (2008, p. 161). Yet if
law students are not studying any science beyond a high-
school level and can then avoid any further science at pre-
or post-qualification stages of their education, when are
lawyers learning how to handle ‘evidence’ and interpret
information—the mainstay of their occupation? If becom-
ing a criminal law practitioner, lawyers may often be re-
quired to assess scientific evidence, yet have no educated
basis upon which to do this. Such a criticism could also
include a basic understanding of statistics, which is also
barely introduced, if at all, on a traditional law degree.
According to Gabel (2010), “Mathematics and science are
a black hole in legal education” (p. 257). Even if consider-
ing a law degree a liberal arts degree, and not a vocational
one, there are wider benefits of a ‘broadly conceived’ law
degree in tackling scientific illiteracy among the general
population.
This omission in law degrees has increasingly been
lamented (see McCartney 2008). For instance, according
to Gabel (2010), “Law students underestimate the amount
of science and mathematics required for legal practice
even in areas unrelated to forensic evidence issues” (p.
258), and yet the disciplines of law and science remain di-
vided not just paradigmatically but often geographically;
scientists and lawyers rarely meet on a university campus
(barely ever at conferences) or find themselves research-
ing co-operatively; they will also not be catered for in
the same libraries or literature sources, or by the same
research funding bodies. In England and Wales, the Qual-
ity Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA) bench-
mark for a B.A. law degree has no mention of science, but
does state that graduates should have numeracy skills and
shouldbe able “where relevant andas thebasis for anargu-
ment, to use, present, and evaluate information provided
in numerical or statistical form.”9 The Solicitors Regula-
tion Authority validates the LLB ‘qualifying’ law degree
for potential solicitors. Their criteria make nomention of
numeracy skills, or make any reference to science, inter-
disciplinary knowledge, or evidence handling.10
The place of ‘law’ within forensic science university
curricula is perhaps more uncertain. In the United King-
dom, the QAA sets national benchmarks for degrees, de-
tailing the expectations of graduate skills and abilities in
that discipline. As yet, there is no QAA benchmark for
forensic science or crime scene examination (although
one is reportedly in development), making the content of
degrees in this field much more variable and, perhaps,
arbitrary. In 2007, an independent Forensic Science Reg-
ulator Unit for England and Wales was created. While
the regulator does not have an explicit remit to over-
see forensic science education, his draft code of practice
states under ‘competence’ that forensic science providers
should utilize the available national occupational stan-
dards (NOS) that are promulgated by the Skills Council
for the field, ‘Skills for Justice.’ There are copious NOS
relating to forensic skills, nearly all of which commence
with the requirement that all practitioners know and un-
derstand “the implications for your work of current law,”
although there is no stand-alone NOS for legal knowledge.
There is an important qualitative difference between
education and training, and theNOSaredirected specifically
toward those skills that a practicing forensic practitioner
is expected to possess, although these are not necessarily
directlymappable onto adegreeprogram. Skills for Justice
also sought in 2010 to supplant the UK’s Forensic Science
Society’s (FSSoc) role as an accreditation body for foren-
sic science degrees. Many universities reportedly viewed
the FSSoc accreditation as a costly and timely ‘optional
extra’ and had not sought accreditation. The ‘Forensic
Skillsmark’ accreditation scheme was drafted in partner-
ship with the FSSoc so that employers could rely upon
graduates as having undertaken a high-quality degree. As
yet, Skillsmark accreditation has had little impact with
just seven universities going through the accreditation
process. As such, there remains a gap in the oversight of
UK forensic science degree curricula, with no universally
accepted national standards for content and wide vari-
ance in the delivery of any legal education (see the later
discussion for details).
In the United States, the National Institute of Justice
(NIJ) reported in 1999 that there was a need for national
standards relating to forensic science education and train-
ing (NIJ 1999) and formed a technical working group look-
ing at educational issues. This working group reported
in 2003, a year after the creation of a committee on
the accreditation of academic programs at the American
Academy of Forensic Sciences (AAFS). The AAFS Forensic
Science Education Programs Accreditation Commission
(FEPAC) began accrediting degree programs in 2004, and
to date there are 35 accredited courses. The curriculum
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84 Cassella and McCartney
requirements include, “A minimum of 15 semester hours
in forensic science coursework that covers the following
topics: courtroom testimony; introduction to law; quality
assurance; ethics, professional practice, background; evi-
dence identification, collection, processing; and a survey
of forensic science” (AAFS 2011, p. 8). With a minimum of
fifteenhours spread across such awide range of important
topics, the ‘introduction to law’must be very introductory
indeed.
It has become increasingly common then for calls to
be made for forensic scientists and legal professionals to
end their ‘dialogue of the deaf’ and to communicate ef-
fectively (see House of Commons 2005; McCartney 2008;
National Research Council & Committee on Identifying
the Needs of the Forensic Sciences Community 2009). This
requires both legal professionals and forensic scientists to
understand the basic principles, vernacular, and nomen-
clature of both science and law, as well as the working
practices and customs of each group of practitioners. Yet
while these calls are easilymade, there are fewer attempts
to identify those who will ensure that this understanding
is acquired. The National Research Council and the Com-
mittee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Sciences
Community (2009) produced one of the most high-profile
recent reports calling for greater interdisciplinarity, stat-
ing, “Judges, lawyers, and law students can benefit from
a greater understanding of the scientific bases underly-
ing the forensic sciences”, (p. 218). It firmly places the
responsibility for imparting this understanding with pre-
qualification legal educators: “It might be too late to ef-
fectively train most lawyers and judges once they have
entered their professional fields . . . For the long term, the
best way to get lawyers and judges up to speed is for law
schools to offer better courses in forensic science in their
curricula” (NRC 2009, p. 8–15).
The Committee recommended that to effect this
change:
Better connections must be established and promoted
among experts in forensic science and legal scholars and
practitioners . . . Law schools should enhance this connec-
tion by offering courses in forensic science, by offering
credit for forensic science courses students take in other
colleges, and by developing joint degree programs (NRC
2009, p. 8–17).
Such proposals are laudable, and yet leave most law
educators with a daunting task—how to go about such re-
modelling of their educational structures? Who is going
to make the connections with the forensic science schol-
ars?
When undertaking any new challenge, it is always
good practice to discover how others have previously sur-
mounted similar challenges. However, as Merlino and col-
leagues (2008, p. 193) point out, “No clear picture exists
of the educational landscape with respect to interdisci-
plinary education about science in law schools.” So where
should a keen law lecturer turn for inspiration or guid-
ance? It is not as straightforward as it may seem to well-
intentioned committees when advocating such modifica-
tions to degree programs, to make significant changes,
even without the additional complication of crossing dis-
ciplines.
The ‘Lowering the Drawbridges’ Project
In 2009, funding was received from the University of
Leeds to commence a project to facilitate the building
of vital connections in the academy to ensure that legal
and forensic science undergraduate education remains
‘fit for purpose’ in the 21st century. It aims to start the
process of bringing science to law students, and law to
forensic science students, in the hope that by commenc-
ing cross-disciplinary study during the pre-qualification
stage, there is created the potential for ending the ‘dia-
logue of the deaf’ at the professional stage of their careers.
(And if they do not proceed into a legal/forensic science
career, their greater knowledge base may accrue other
‘transferable skills’ or benefits.)
In early 2009, two surveys were emailed to law and
forensic science lecturers to gather information on the
teaching of law to forensic science students, and forensic
science to law students. Some of the results are repre-
sented graphically below.
Clearly, the majority of forensic science degrees in-
clude some legal education, mostly conducted by legal
academics. It is interesting to note, however, that some
respondents claimed that law teaching is not important
to their programs of study. There are perhaps questions
concerning how much law is required in a forensic sci-
ence program—when forensic science respondents claim
there is “just enough” or even “toomuch” law, howmuch
is enough? If forensic science is science in the pursuit of
justice, should there be a lot more law in these courses? If
forensic science graduates need simply to be ‘good’ scien-
tists, is there time in a packed curriculum to study law?
There are perhaps also questions regarding those who
should be providing the legal education. Can forensic sci-
ence lecturers provide this or should it be the preserve of
law lecturers? There are problems with both approaches:
do law lecturers understand sufficiently what forensic sci-
ence students require, and do forensic science lecturers
understand what is necessary on the curriculum? This
project aims to eventually find some more concrete an-
swers to such questions.
Further to these preliminary surveys, in 2009 a work-
shop was held at Leeds Metropolitan University, UK, at-
tended by over 40 academics and practitioners from sci-
entific and legal backgrounds. This workshop aimed to
address issues related to teaching forensic science and
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Figure 1. Law teaching on forensic programs.
law by bringing together legal and forensic science aca-
demics to explore avenues for improving collaboration
and communication between the two disciplines. Discus-
sion at the workshop quickly revealed that the specific
issues under consideration comprised only a sub-section
of a host of issues that emanate from the highly complex
array of aims and interests (and stakeholders) of these two
disciplines, only some of which were complementary.
It was readily apparent that glibly stating that aca-
demics need to find the time to design more pedagogi-
cally robust material that can cross-disciplinary bound-
aries was obtuse, if not impertinent, given the levels of
Figure 2. Amount of law teaching on forensic programs.
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Figure 3. How much forensic science is taught in your law program?
dedication and effort already demonstrated by many
forensic science and law academics across the UK. What
could be easily concluded without much contestation
is that achieving anything like true cross-disciplinary
educational aims requires a far more fundamental re-
thinking, necessitating a new common language in or-
der that those academics working in diverse areas of aca-
demic pursuit can understand one another. This is an
essential prerequisite before ‘systems’ can be made to
communicate (to facilitate student and/or staffmovement
across schools/faculties etc.), and ultimately, students can
be taught to study, converse, and be understood across
law/science borders. Finding the route(s) to true cross-
disciplinary experiences for students is, however, highly
complex, although this did not preclude insightful dis-
cussion throughout the workshop, some of which is sum-
marized below.
Theworkshopwas not designed, nor could it have been
possible to expect in just one day, to come to firm con-
clusions about solutions that could then be easily imple-
mented (nor of course, could we tackle myriad causal is-
sues of the law/science divide that lay without the realm
of the higher education system). The aim of the workshop
was not to produce a template or ‘best practice’ guidance
for academics, but to begin the process of understanding
how to recognize best practice and what form any guid-
ance may eventually take. The organizers hoped to scope
out the ‘problem’ (if it is conceded there were one) and
a range of potential future actions that may enable col-
leagues to begin collaborations and cooperative working.
As could be expected, there were a range of concerns, a
variety of opinions, and rarely a consensus. We hope here
to reflect some of the wide-ranging views and highlight
areas where consensus was found.
Workshop Discussion
Is it Necessary for Forensic Science Students to Study
Law?
The perception that there is a career pathway for gradu-
ates of forensic science courses dictates thatmany degrees
will incorporate a strong emphasis on training students
to fulfill the ‘role’ of a forensic scientist (although these
are many and diverse). Notwithstanding the ongoing de-
bate surrounding whether forensic science students re-
ceive enough ‘core’ science during their degree, there was
a consensus that forensic science students need to un-
derstand the role of a forensic scientist within the legal
process and what would be expected of them in the var-
ious roles they may encounter. It is then essential that
students gained a thorough understanding of the context
in which their future careers may be situated, involving
the law and the legal system ( justifying the forensic prefix
to their science degree).
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There are strong arguments that the best forensic sci-
entists will have a deep understanding of the forensic
element of their profession (see Margot 2011). To under-
stand what procedures/tests etc. are required in any given
investigation, the scientist needs to be able to isolate the
question they are attempting to answer. That question
will very often be framed as a legal question (though not
always). For example, if a forensic examiner understands
that the police have seized materials from the scene of
a potential murder, then they can prepare themselves to
answer more fully questions that will undoubtedly arise
when examining exhibits from the scene or items seized,
such as potential weapons or clothing worn by suspects
and victims (e.g. is there bloodpresent?Howmuch,where,
andwhose is it? Is there any significance to the blood from
an investigative perspective?).11 Indeed, it is often the job
of the forensic scientist to discern whether there is a legal
problem to be solved at all (i.e., at the scene of an appar-
ent suicide or upon recovery of some bone fragments). As
one forensic examiner remarked, they didn’t truly under-
stand their role as a forensic scientist until they studied
law because they then understood why they were doing
certain tests and what other tests may be required.
Very often, a forensic scientist’s greatest value is pro-
viding guidance to investigators and other legal profes-
sionals by advising on what needs investigating and on
what value can be added to an investigation by certain ex-
aminations. An understanding of what the investigators
need to know (and eventually, perhaps the courts) will
make their advice more astute. One of the greatest disap-
pointments ofmany forensic scientists is that their advice
is not sought more often and at earlier opportunities. A
proficient forensic scientist will be able to present their
findings to a legal and lay audience and guide them with
their understanding of what the legal professionals are
trying to achieve.
For many, the controversy is not the lack of law during
the typical forensic science undergraduate degree, but the
lack of science. There are those who doubt that forensic
science programs are sufficiently ‘scientific,’ and so in-
sisting upon incorporating more ‘non-science’ elements
may be counter-productive to them. However, the idea
that forensic science graduates need only be good sci-
entists is increasingly under challenge, although many
continue to argue that good graduates can learn to ap-
ply their scientific knowledge to the forensic arena after
graduation—that the forensic element can be taught by
their employers and gained through experience. While
there is merit in the argument that forensic science stu-
dents need first and foremost to be good scientists, it can-
not be denied that a fuller understanding of the ‘foren-
sic’ aspect of their job would make them better forensic
scientists just as Roberts (Forthcoming) explains: “Good
science with no scope for legal applications can never be
good forensic science” [Roberts’ emphasis].
What is the Current Situation with Respect to Law
Teaching Within Forensic Science Programs?
Most of those attending the workshop attested that they
had already taught law to their forensic science stu-
dents.Whilst some forensic science lecturers claimed that
their students were well versed in the law, many others
lamented that their students had no prior understand-
ing of criminal proceedings, and that their goal was sim-
ply to provide them with some rudimentary grasp of the
basics, while others claimed that most law was simply
irrelevant for forensic science students: “It’s instantly for-
gettable,” said one workshop attendee. Opinion clearly
differed over howmuch law should be required for foren-
sic science students and over the ability of many foren-
sic science students to complete the law assessments, as
they differ markedly from those in their science modules.
This was often the motivation behind forensic science lec-
turers taking law classes: they hoped only to cover what
was strictly necessary and in a form digestible to science
students, with assessment that they could successfully
pass—a bespoke course. Most often, this translates into
a single module on the basics of the criminal process
and criminal justice system. Seven of the 33 forensic sci-
ence lecturers who responded to the survey claimed that
there was no involvement of legal academics with their
program. Many others explained that they simply made
compulsory the basic ‘English legal system’-type modules
in the first-year law program for their first-year science
students.
There were also reciprocal arrangements whereby an
introductory module on forensic science was provided by
the science faculty staff for law students, in return for a
‘Science in Court’ module for forensic science students
run by the law school. Those that sent their students to
the law school for their legal training often felt that their
students were ‘thrown in the deep end’ and often strug-
gled (11 of the 33 forensic science respondents explained
that the law school took their students with no input at
all from their department)—though others countered that
the students found it stimulating to be among full-time
law students.
Forensic science lecturers also reported in the survey
and during the workshops that they were able to intro-
duce relevant legal aspects to their students as they were
proceeding through their curricula. For example, they
would inform them of the legal aspects of casework and
discuss with students the appropriate legal matters per-
taining to, for example, drugs, alcohol, sexual offences,
etc. For some, they explained that they would have a
guest lecture during the three-year course, covering
something pertinent, such as expert evidence, either in
addition or as their sole legal education provision. More
common is a mock-court scenario, with forensic science
students taught how to present evidence in court using
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [S
taf
fo
rd
sh
ire
 U
niv
ers
ity
], 
[jo
hn
 ca
sse
lla
] a
t 0
5:2
1 1
4 O
cto
be
r 2
01
1 
88 Cassella and McCartney
mock trials. For many, there was law school involvement
with such events, either using the staff of the law school
or sometimes their students.
What Should be Taught and By Whom?
It is clear from the survey responses and workshop that
there was no consensus on what precisely should be
taught to forensic science students and by whom. Most
commonly, forensic science lecturers believed that they
could convey the ‘law’ to their students, while legal aca-
demics believed that legal education was best left to le-
gal academics. Such an approach is quite understandable
and was mirrored when tackling the obverse of this ques-
tion. This lack of consensus presents an obvious stum-
bling block in trying to develop pedagogic materials to
assist educators and students. Most obviously, forensic
science students need to have an understanding of the le-
gal regimes surrounding investigations and their role in
the investigative process, as Roberts (2009, p. 447) makes
clear: “Forensic scientists are subject to legal strictures
no less than any other professional investigator, and they
therefore have powerful incentives to know the legal rules
which apply to their situation and to strive at all times to
conduct themselves in accordance with the law.” A basic
grasp of police powers and the law surrounding assault
andmurder, among others, would then assist them to un-
derstand themachinations of investigations. There are, of
course, other laws that have a direct bearing on the work
of forensic scientists, including criminal or civil proce-
dure rules, which set out the role of an expert witness.
Learning this aspect of law, how police conduct investi-
gations and the legal regime within which they operate,
the criminal/civil process, as well as the duties of the ex-
pert witness, would all be essential learning outcomes of
any forensic science degree program. The question then
arises: how much depth does the student need to go into
these fields?
Some attendees questioned whether the relevant pro-
fessional and regulatory bodies could provide guidance or
requirements. For example, in England andWales, the So-
licitors Regulation Authority regulates the LLB qualifying
law degree, stipulating what modules are foundational
andmust be delivered to have accredited status, although
success in modifying these ‘foundation’ modules is ex-
tremely limited. Attempts to accredit forensic science de-
gree programs are still very limited (as of June 2011, just
7 universities have endorsed forensic degrees out of the
39 that offer them), and there are no requirements in cur-
rent regimes to provide legal education beyond the skills
required to deliver expert evidence in court. The first step
must then be to reach a consensus on the ‘ideal’ legal
components of a forensic science degree. It may be that
employers dictate their terms in such a scenario.
Is It Necessary for Law Students to be Taught About
Forensic Science?
This session examined what scientific education law stu-
dents ought to receive, working on the premise that there
should be some element(s) of science available to those stu-
dentswho eitherwant it or need it for their future careers.
It would be wrong, however, to give the impression that
there is universal acceptance that science ought to be a
necessary element of a law curriculum. Clearly it may not
be appropriate for every law student to delve into foren-
sic science, particularly those who do not wish to enter
into the legal profession, and so it may be entirely inap-
propriate to make compulsory any scientific training. As
with all subjects, there is a real issue of curriculum over-
load. If science were to be introduced, what should be
left out to make room? There are already many demands
made of the law curriculum (not least by regulators), and
many more legal topics that many would consider essen-
tial that are omitted due to pressures on the timetable.
There is some acceptance, however, that a basic ground-
ing in science could be relevant for any undergraduate
student, pursuing almost any career, and that there are
important transferable skills and knowledge to be gained.
The current lack of scientific education at the university
level for law students was viewed as disabling them.
There was also a clear agreement that there is insuffi-
cient forensic science being delivered and taught to those
law students on legal courses who did have an interest in
practicing law (either criminal or any other area of law).
This may be explained partially by the aversion to science
seen among law undergraduates, which also extends to
the academics. Many legal academics may not have stud-
ied science for some considerable time, which may natu-
rally lead to reluctance to introduce science into a law cur-
riculum (or more probably, simply a lack of appreciation
that anything is ‘missing’). Just as legal professionals call
upon forensic scientists to deliver science when required
in the legal process, it may be then that forensic scientists
need to be engaged when it is necessary to deliver teach-
ing in the area. There was then a consensus that it would
be helpful to the legal community if some instruction on
the basic methodology of science were introduced at the
pre-qualification stage for lawyers. Statistics and reason-
ing, in particular, need attention to establishhow theories
are presented, evaluated, and what can be deduced from
the evidence.
What is the Current Situation with Respect to
Teaching Forensic Science Within Law Programs?
Many law lecturers expressed frustration at the (per-
ceived) obstacles to teaching forensic science to their law
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students. Many were deterred because of a belief that they
would be required to deliver sciencematerials themselves
and were not qualified to do so: “I would like to incorpo-
rate aspects of forensic science but don’t feel confident
about the science aspect,” said one participant. Most law
lecturers admitted that the only time that forensic sci-
ence entered their teaching was when dealing with ex-
pert evidence during evidence modules, and then only
in relation to the laws regarding the reception of expert
evidence. However, many denounced the scientific aware-
ness of their law students, saying, “The students lack even
themost basic knowledge.”12Whilemost admitted to hav-
ing no or inadequate forensic science instruction (or cov-
erage of the basic principles of science or statistics, for
example), those that did have some provision expressed
great student satisfaction with the modules, saying, “This
module is much in demand and popular with students,”
and “our most popular elective.”
While the modules were popular, there were issues
raised over the standards/levels between lawmodules and
science modules, particularly if they carried the same
credit weighting. There appeared some suspicion that sci-
ence modules could be easier/harder than law modules
and assessmentswere varied,meaning that some students
could benefit or be disadvantaged by the lack of com-
parability. Reports of law students receiving 95 percent
in a science module where such a mark would be virtu-
ally unattainable in any law modules caused concerns.
Clearly, the assessments and levels of marking, etc., and
credits for modules from other disciplines is an issue that
would need resolving.
What Should Be Taught and By Whom?
Discussion and survey feedback on what should be in-
cluded in any forensic science teaching to law students
ranged widely between simply raising ‘forensic aware-
ness,’ or conveying the basic principles of science, to en-
gaging in contentious scientific debate and undertaking
introductory science modules, including laboratory expe-
rience. Those keenest on spanning the disciplinary divide
believed that law students would benefit from a thorough
grounding in scientific disciplines and knowledge of the
working life of a forensic scientist. Others suggested that
a brief rundown of different techniques popularly em-
ployed (suchaDNAandfingerprints, footwear, toxicology,
etc.)wasmore thanadequate. The opposite endof the spec-
trum countered that theremay bemore important things
to include on the undergraduate law degree that should
take precedence over forensic science. If you were to ask
a cross-section of law lecturers what they would like to
see on the undergraduate law degree, you will get almost
as many different answers as lecturers, a similar response
no doubt predictable among forensic science lecturers.
While it was agreed that students, particularly those
wishing to pursue a legal career, should understand the
law surrounding expert evidence, there was less agree-
ment over whether this should extend to the law regard-
ing police investigations and forensic inquiry (including
issues such as continuity and integrity). The value of teach-
ing case histories where the law and forensic science had
combined to result in a failure of justice was emphasized,
however. There was also deliberation over whether law
students should understand the science behind forensic
techniques (suggestions that there could be a Dummies
Guide to . . . for various forensic disciplines), or whether
they should simply know what questions to ask of the
experts and how to assess their credibility. However, it
would be difficult to determine what questions to ask an
expert without a grasp of the limits of the evidence and
the science underlying a technique like DNA profiling, or
even to know when an expert could be of assistance or is
required.
It was agreed that law students are not sufficiently in-
structed in how to deal with ‘evidence’ or ‘facts’ (mirror-
ing a protracted debate among evidence scholars). Many
declared that law studentshadpoor evaluation skills,with
this merely extending to scientific facts, despite an appre-
ciation of probative value being an essential skill for a
lawyer. In a lengthy survey response, reproduced here in
part, David Carson, an evidence law lecturer, spelled out
his vision of the problem and solution:
The core problem is the intellectual narrowness of the
law degree . . . dominated by cognitive, knowing, objec-
tives. Whilst there are distinctive, and critically impor-
tant, doing skills (e.g., legal research and detailed analysis
of statutes and case law precedents), these are focused
upon in one year, the first, and then honed over the next
two albeit on different topics. An ‘add-on knowledge’men-
tality (whether law and forensics or law and psychology)
is never going to allow legal studies to become genuinely
inter-disciplinary. Law students need, not just for richer in-
tellectual stimulation but also to be more creative in the
range of occupations they enter, a much broader range
of intellectual skills, such as in scientific methodology, in
broader inferential reasoning, probability theory, and pre-
sentation. Being aware of what other disciplines can offer,
perhaps as expert evidence, is no substitute for abilities
to think differently, to possess a forensic or sociological
imagination. Equally it is demeaning to encourage other
disciplines to think that knowing ‘the law’ on a topic is
all they can, or should, be competent with. Investigators
and forensic scientists need (and can be given) muchmore
from lawyers than knowledge of the exclusionary rules
of evidence. If there are to be developments . . . it should
be through a focus on forensic investigation, assessment,
presentation, and proof. That would require the develop-
ment of a broader range of intellectual skills, not just the
broadening of the curriculum. That would focus upon the
many problems with our legal system.
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There was disagreement over whether legal academics
should take responsibility for this. Therewas almost unan-
imous opinion that forensic science lecturers should not
be left to instruct science students in the law, but there ap-
peared to be less apprehensionwhen consideringwhether
law lecturers could teach scientific principles. However,
it was stressed that in any experiential learning, or more
advanced science, a scientist could teach it far better.
Nearly all elective science modules presently available
to law students are taught in science departments with
little interaction between staff and departments over con-
tent, assessment, etc. This is regrettable, but many inter-
preted this as explicable by a general lack of communi-
cation or any ties between science and law faculties. As
participants bemoaned, there is a cultural divide in uni-
versities between ‘hard’ sciences and the ‘softer’ science
(if law can be considered a social science for a moment)
departments and staff. This landscape makes collabora-
tion over modules difficult, time consuming, and admin-
istratively complex for academics that wish to bridge the
divide. As one delegate explained figuratively, “First, we
need small walls between departments, not the big ones
that we have now.”
Workshop Conclusions?
The last session of the workshop asked delegates to en-
gage in discussion on how to address the issues raised,
and what next steps were required. The most immediate
obstacle to overcome is that, as the workshop and sur-
vey responses attest, there is presently no consensus over
what is required by each cohort of students. This discord
among educators is reflected among students themselves,
as is demonstrated in the research into forensic science
degrees undertaken by the UK’s Skills for Justice body. It
reports that when commenting upon course content:
Comments were wide-ranging and in many cases con-
tradictory. Some students applauded the high science con-
tent of their degree program, whilst others complained
that there was not enough science content. Similarly,
some suggested that there was too much content based
on understanding the law, whilst others indicated that
there was not enough of this (Skills for Justice 2009, p. 48).
Second, there is no apparent best practice model avail-
able for emulation. What is clear is that there is demand
for essential groundwork to be carried out so that ed-
ucators in both disciplines can commence collaborative
work, building bespoke modules for students based on
sound pedagogic principles and addressing the needs of
each cohort—which can and will, of course, vary consid-
erably according to such variables as degree type, level,
resources available (including personnel), and the teach-
ing and assessment of the course being tailored to the
students.
There are potentiallymany other barriers andobstacles
that may prevent or slow progress. These include practi-
cal issues such as the geographic locations and distances
between many schools. (Indeed, some universities do not
have both a law and a forensic science department.) Find-
ing time for academics todo the essential groundworkwas
also viewed as a primary stumbling block. There was also
conjecture that the majority of academics would not see
the value of the enterprise and overcoming reluctance, or
that locating enthusiastic collaborators may prove ardu-
ous. Academics expressed the sentiment that, in this area,
there were presently no sticks to avoid, nor any carrots to
be found, so therefore little motivation.
Although resource issues were highlighted, it was felt
that with sharing of resources and ensuring that there
were not diverse efforts across the country, resources
could be managed effectively. There was also mention
of tapping into funding for research-led teaching innova-
tions, such as Open Educational Resource (OER) funding,
etc. Interim measures, including setting up a network of
academics prepared to act as guest lecturers in other de-
partments, could act as an immediate stopgap.
Delegates of the workshop also suggested the estab-
lishment of a collaborative multidisciplinary forum or
network for the free flow of information between foren-
sic science and law academics and practitioners. How this
forum or network would be formed and by whom was a
harder question to answer. It was also suggested that im-
mediate steps could be taken on somemodules to increase
interaction between law and forensic science students,
such as including law students in forensic science mock
cross-examinations, etc. One thingwas certain: academics
require the support of their department heads and senior
university management. It was reiterated time and again
that resources (largely in terms of time and the workload
for already over-stretched academics) would be required,
and thesewouldnot be forthcoming if the universityman-
agement were not fully supportive of the enterprise.
Conclusion
The work conducted by the scientific community can
sometimes bemisunderstood,misinterpreted, and/ormis-
represented by lawyers and scientists alike. The probative
and evidential value of forensic science often needs to
be better understood by legal professionals, while con-
troversy continues over ‘unreliable’ forensic evidence uti-
lized during the criminal process. The 2009 National
Academy of Sciences report is just the latest to throw
down a gauntlet to educators to take preventative action
and bridge the science/law divide at undergraduate level,
and yet little reaction has been apparent amid law and
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science faculties. This Lowering the Drawbridge project
was therefore stimulated by a) the hope that there were
educators in the UK who had successfully risen to such
a challenge already and from whom lessons could be
learned and disseminated; b) the knowledge that many
forensic science educators included (with varying success)
some basic legal education in their degrees and so had ex-
perience of the interdisciplinary process, but for whom
this still often remained their beˆte noire; and c) the wish
to build the connections and possible collaborative part-
nerships with law and forensic science educators.
Not all commentators are optimistic that the present
difficulties with specialization will be overcome soon;
indeed, some believe it may be insurmountable: “Ig-
norance of fields outside one’s specialty is inevitable,”
says Latham (2010, p. 34). Such sentiments may be self-
fulfilling prophecies if the academy does not take up the
challenge to bridge the law/science divide in higher ed-
ucation. Inertia within regulatory bodies and higher ed-
ucation management is a sufficient deterrent for those
law colleagues who may entertain thoughts of tinkering
with the status quo. Perhaps until the educational and le-
gal regulatory bodies demand more scientific knowledge
from legal professionals, science will remain an ‘optional
extra’ in an already over-burdened law curriculum and
vice versa.
There is perhaps a risk that we expend precious effort
upon a wild goose chase for an ‘educational elixir’ for
the law/science rift, whichmay be partly based upon false
conceptions of both science and law:
Certainly changes in the education system might go a
long way to closing the breach between the two cultures.
. . .But the gapbetween the two cultures also results froma
particular conception of science and scientific knowledge,
a conceptionwith enormous influence still, even if science
does not actually fit it (deMelo-Martin 2008, p. 9).
Indeed, the authors are not searching within their de-
partments for an educational panacea to a problem with
many potential variables that need attending to before a
cure or an effective vaccination can be claimed to have
been developed. “Money and power are the oldest, sim-
plest, and most common sources of friction between so-
cial groups, so no doubt part of the law-science conflict is
explained in this way,” states Condlin (1999, p. 184).
Yet the authors believe there should be optimism that
legal and forensic science educators can work coopera-
tively to respond to critics and forge newpaths in learning
and teaching in both law and forensic science, creating
an opportunity to take stock and enrich our disciplines;
according to Roberts (2007), “If, after all, university schol-
ars and teachers decline to keep their subject in good
theoretical, pedagogical, and practical shape, who else
will be motivated or qualified to take up the challenge?”
(p. 19). Despite the possible size and complexity of the
task ahead, the authors have found much enthusiasm for
the continuation of the project, with a groundswell of
opinion that (perceived or real) obstacles should not be
permitted to stymie efforts. There are powerful external
drivers that should motivate the introduction of science
(and statistical method) into law degrees. Miscarriages of
justice involving forensic evidence have provided plenti-
ful opportunity for the legal and scientific communities
to reflect upon failings and seek preventative medicine.
Most often, trial lawyers have found convenient fall guys
(Walker andMcCartney 2005) in experts giving testimony.
However:
One might question whether the mechanisms of crim-
inal justice must also shoulder some responsibility. If
judges feel unable to assess expert evidence, how is justice
to be secured, through avoiding, or unduly simplifying is-
sues and reducing the possibility of legitimate challenge
by procedural or cost diktat . . . A better response is to
examine whether training in forensic science offered by
the Judicial Studies Board, or indeed law schools, is suf-
ficient. With the legal system increasingly dependent on
science and technology, educational courses on forensic
process must necessarily be part of core training for all
legal professionals (Walker and McCartney 2005, p. 129).
It may assist those who are presented with scientific
evidence to begin to understand the evidence before
them—or even to spot common errors or misunderstand-
ings, or make an educated guess about the reliability of
a technique, to have a rudimentary understanding of the
scientific method and basic statistics. According to Ross
(2011), “It is highly likely that at least some of the well-
publicized forensic science ‘failures’mightwell have been
avoided had the evidence at the time been adequately
tested pre-trial and in the courts by knowledgeable and
well-prepared lawyers”(p. 141). Likewise, it would assist
all forensic science graduates to have a full and sound
understanding of the forensic aspect of their profession,
requiring at minimum some basic grounding in law. This
should not be beyond the wit of faculty to introduce. As
Latham (2010, p. 34) exhorts, we are not interested in
turning lawyers into scientists and vice versa, but build-
ing a foundation upon which they can build during their
professional lives. “Instead of melding the two cultures,
we need to establish conditions of cooperation, mutual
respect, and mutual reliance between them,” he says.
The ambition of the Lowering the Drawbridges project
is to stimulate both law and forensic science educators
to lower their drawbridges and seek mutually beneficial
solutions to common educational problems. This will not
only reap benefits for students, but the legal/forensic sci-
ence professions of the future, and ultimately will assist
the criminal justice system in its aims because, as Gabel
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(2010) notes, “A broader openness andgreater understand-
ing of math and science in the legal field would perhaps
lead to fewer wrongful convictions” (p. 256.) If the enthu-
siasm of the delegates at the workshop were widespread,
then law and forensic science educators can indeed assist
with the building of a mutual understanding between
forensic scientists and legal professionals, a step on the
road to answering calls for the professions to minimize
some of the risks associated with the use of forensic sci-
ence in the criminal process. As Condlin (1999, p. 183)
wrote over a decade ago when referring to the reluctant
bedfellows of law and science: “Not working effectively
with one another is no longer an option for either disci-
pline, if it ever was.”
Endnotes
1. See Callan, K. 1997. Kevin Callan’s story. London: Little, Brown
and Company.
2. R v Clark (2003) EWCA Crim 1020.
3. Defendants were later exonerated by post-conviction DNA
testing.
4. For an incisive summary, see the National Research Coun-
cil’s 2009 National Academy of Science’s (NAS) Report,
which discusses the ‘problems’ with forensic science, in-
cluding a lack of scientific bases and methodologies; parti-
san practitioners; the influence of law enforcement; a lack
of funding for research and facilities; and lack of postgrad-
uate training, among others.
5. Such concerns may not be quite so acute in other branches
of law, where lawyers working within these fields have
“achieved a level of scientific literacy relevant to their work,
for example, the patent bar, which always had it; the med-
ical malpractice bar; and those elements of the bar that
work in administrative law in science-related areas such as
environmental, and food and drug law.” (Latham 2008, p.
33).
6. Latham explains that this may be worse in the UK than in
the United States due to the specialization in education that
is more prevalent in UK universities (2008, p. 33).
7. In England and Wales, the qualifying law degree can be
taken at undergraduate level (entrants aged 18), rather than
at graduate level as in the United States, so students can
come straight from high school, where ‘A-levels’ are sat in
their final year to enter university.
8. Law School Admission Council. 1999 National statistical re-
port: 2003–2004 through 2007–2008. Newtown, PA: LSAC.
9. QAA benchmark for BA Law available at: http://www.qaa.
ac.uk/academicinfrastructure/benchmark/honours/law.asp.
10. The Joint Statement on Qualifying Law Degrees prepared
jointly by the Law Society and the Bar Council sets out
the conditions a law degree course must meet in or-
der to be termed a “qualifying law degree.” Available at:
http://www.sra.org.uk/students/academic-stage.page.
11. The amount of information required by a practitioner
remains debated; however, the potential for contextual
bias and observer effects to hamper objective assessment
strongly supports arguments for examiners to operate in a
‘double-blind’ position (See Thompson 2011). This is not to
suggest then that the examiner requires investigative facts.
12. This was contrasted by those teaching in Scotland, where
students have had to continue science studies for the dura-
tion of their high school education.
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